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EBOLA	 AND	 THE	 AIRPLANE	 –	 SECURING	 MOBILITY	 THROUGH	 REGIME	
INTERACTIONS	AND	LEGAL	ADAPTATION	
**	Gearóid	Ó	Cuinn	and	Stephanie	Switzer	
ABSTRACT		
This	article	concentrates	on	a	particular	controversy	during	the	2014	Ebola	outbreak	in	
West	 Africa;	 the	 mass	 cancellation	 of	 flights	 to	 and	 from	 affected	 countries.	 This	
occurred	despite	authoritative	advice	against	 such	 restrictions	 from	the	World	Health	
Organisation	(WHO).	During	a	public	health	emergency	such	as	Ebola,	the	airplane	sits	
at	 a	 site	 of	 regulatory	 uncertainty	 as	 it	 falls	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 two	 specialist	 and	
overlapping	 domains	 of	 international	 law;	 the	WHO	 International	 Health	 Regulations	
(2005)	 and	 the	 Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	 Aviation.	 We	 explore	 how	 legal	
technicalities	 and	 objects,	 by	 promoting	 functional	 interactions	 between	 these	 two	
specialised	regimes	of	law,	were	utilised	to	deal	with	this	uncertainty.	We	show	how	the	
form	and	function	of	these	mundane	tools	had	a	significant	impact;	assimilating	aviation	
further	into	the	system	of	global	health	security	as	well	as	instrumentalising	the	aircraft	
as	a	tool	of	disease	surveillance.	This	encounter	of	regimes	was	law	creating,	resulting	in	
new	international	protocols	and	standards	designed	to	enable	the	resumption	of	flights	
in	 and	 out	 of	 countries	 affected	 by	 outbreaks.	 This	 article	 therefore	 offers	 significant	
and	original	 insights	 into	the	hidden	work	performed	by	 legal	 techniques	and	tools	 in	
dealing	 with	 regime	 overlap.	 Our	 findings	 contribute	 to	 the	 wider	 international	 law	
literature	 on	 fragmentation	 and	 enrich	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 significance	 of	
relational	regime	interactions	in	international	law.		
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INTRODUCTION		
The	 	 2014/2015	 Ebola	 outbreak	 claimed	 over	 11,000	 lives	 in	 West	 Africa,1	 and	
devastated	 Liberia,	 Guinea	 and	 Sierra	 Leone,	 the	 three	 most	 affected	 countries.2	 Its	
extraordinary	 nature	 prompted	 the	 UN	 Security	 Council	 to	 categorise	 it	 as	 a	 risk	 to	
international	 peace	 and	 security3	while	 the	World	Health	Organisation	 (WHO),	 acting	
under	 the	 International	 Health	 Regulations4	 (IHR	 2005),	 declared	 it	 a	 Public	 Health	
Emergency	 of	 International	 Concern	 (PHEIC).5	 The	 WHO	 also	 issued	 temporary	
recommendations6	that	aimed	to	strike	a	balance	between	preventing	the	international	
spread	 of	 the	 disease,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 avoiding	 ‘unnecessary	 interference	with	
international	 traffic	 and	 trade’	 on	 the	 other.7	 The	 WHO	 IHR	 Emergency	 Committee	
advised	against	travel	restrictions	with	the	exception	of	Ebola	cases	and	their	contacts.8			
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1	WHO,	 ‘Ground	zero	in	Guinea:	the	Ebola	outbreak	smoulders	–	undetected	–	for	more	than	3	months’,	
available	at	http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/guinea/en/.		
2	 UNICEF,	 ‘Impact	 of	 Ebola’,	 21	 July	 2016,	 available	 at	
www.unicef.org/emergencies/ebola/75941_76129.html.	
3	 UNSC	 Resolution	 2177	 (2014)	 available	 at	
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2177%20(2014).	
4	World	 Health	 Assembly,	 Revision	 of	 the	 International	 Health	 Regulations,	WHA58.3	 (May	 23,	 2005)	
(hereinafter	IHR	(2005)).	
5	WHO,	 ‘Statement	on	the	1st	Meeting	of	the	IHR	Emergency	Committee	on	the	2014	Ebola	Outbreak	in	
West	 Africa’,	 8	 August	 2014,	 available	 www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-
20140808/en/	
6	Pursuant	to	IHR	(2005),	Art.	15.		
7	IHR	2005,	Art.	2.	
8	WHO,	supra	note	5.	
Despite	 recommendations	 from	 the	WHO	 advising	 minimal	 travel	 restrictions	 to	 the	
Ebola	affected	countries,	numerous	airlines	cancelled	their	services.9	A	large	number	of	
countries	 also	 restricted	 flights	 to	 and	 from	 West	 Africa,10	 with	 significant	 and	
immediate	 consequences	 for	 the	 affected	 area.11	 Nonetheless,	 by	 the	 time	 the	 PHEIC	
was	eventually	lifted	by	the	WHO	during	March	2016,12	several	airlines	opted	to	resume	
flights.13		
Uncertainty	and	 fear	played	a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 cancellations.	From	a	governance	
standpoint,	the	airplane	occupies	an	unclear	and	fragmented	legal	space.	It	falls	within	
the	 scope	 of	 two	 specialist	 and	 overlapping	 domains	 of	 international	 law;	 the	WHO’s	
IHR	 (2005)	 and	 the	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	 Organisation’s	 (ICAO)	 Convention	 on	
International	 Civil	 Aviation,	 or	 the	 ‘Chicago	 Convention’	 as	 it	 is	 more	 commonly	
known.14	While	the	emphasis	of	the	Chicago	Convention	may	be	said	to	be	on	securing	
passenger	 safety,	 the	 IHR	 (2005)	 is	 premised	 upon	 protecting	 global	 health	 security	
through	bolstering,	among	other	things,	surveillance.		
We	 focus	 on	 the	 cancellation	 and	 subsequent	 resumption	 of	 flights	 during	 the	 Ebola	
outbreak.	Much	of	the	legal	literature	written	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Ebola	outbreak	has	
focused	 largely	 on	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 WHO/IHR	 (2005)	 to	 respond	 effectively	 to	 the	
                                                             
9	See	discussion	at	section	three,	infra.	
10	See	Cohen	et	al.,	‘Travel	and	Border	Health	Measures	to	Prevent	the	International	Spread	of	Ebola’,	CDC,	
8	July	2016,	available	at	www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/su/su6503a9.htm.	
11	 See	generally	 T.	Nierle	and	B.	 Jochum,	 ‘Ebola:	 The	Failures	 of	 the	 International	Outbreak	Response’,	
Medicins	 San	 Frontieres,	 27	 August	 2014,	 available	 at	 http://www.msf.org/article/ebola-failures-
international-outbreak-response.		
12	WHO,	Statement	on	the	9th	meeting	of	the	IHR	Emergency	Committee	regarding	the	Ebola	outbreak	in	
West	 Africa’,	 29	 March	 2016,	 available	 at	 www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2016/end-of-
ebola-pheic/en/.	
13	 See	 generally	 B.	 Vickers	 and	 D.	 Games,	 ‘The	 Ebola	 Crisis:	 Implications	 for	 trade	 and	 regional	
integration’,	 ICTSD,	 6	 May	 2015,	 available	 at	 https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-
africa/news/the-ebola-crisis-implications-for-trade-and-regional-integration		
14	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization	(ICAO),	Convention	on	Civil	Aviation,	7	December	1944,	(1994)	
15	U.N.T.S.	295	(hereinafter	Chicago	Convention).		
outbreak.15	 	 Our	 approach	 is	 different;	 we	 investigate	 how	 the	 international	 regimes	
applicable	 to	 public	 health	 and	 aviation	 co-functioned	 during	 the	 Ebola	 outbreak	 and	
the	 impact	 these	 interactions	 had	 on	 producing	 certainty	 and	 coherence	 in	 the	
governance	of	infectious	disease	in	air	travel.	Our	account	moves	beyond	the	traditional	
lens	of	conflict	and	litigation	which	has	tended	to	dominate	traditional	legal	accounts	of	
regime	interactions.16	We	instead	contribute	to	the	growing	literature	on	international	
law’s	 ‘relational	 interactions’17	 -	 the	ways	 in	which	distinct	regimes	of	law	collaborate	
and	ensure	coherence	through	practice.18			
We	demonstrate	how	ordinary	legal	tools	and	techniques	–	‘legal	technicalities’	–	were	
deployed	to	harmonize	the	norms,	actors	and	processes	of	each	regime	in	responding	to	
the	 threat	 of	 international	 spread	 of	 disease	 via	 air	 travel.	 While	 legal	 technicalities	
could	be	dismissed	as	the	uninteresting	tools	of	lawyers,	this	work	adds	to	an	emerging	
socio-legal	scholarship	inspired	by	the	work	of	Annelise	Riles19	and	Mariana	Valverde20	
which	 has	 shown	 how	mundane	 legal	 tools	 exert	 their	 own	 agency,	 thereby	 making	
them	worthy	of	greater	attention.21	We	engage	with	the	role	of	law	by	being,	as	Valverde	
puts	it,	‘simultaneously	inside	and	outside	law,	simultaneously	technical	and	theoretical,	
legal	and	socio-legal.’22	 In	 turn,	we	show	how	legal	 tools	and	artefacts	 facilitated	what	
                                                             
15	See	for	example	L.	O.	Gostin,	‘Ebola:	towards	an	International	Health	Systems	Fund’,	(2014),	available	at	
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2383&context=facpub.	
16	For	discussion	see	 J.	L.	Dunoff,	 ‘A	New	Approach	 to	Regime	 Interaction’	 in	M.	A.	Young	 (ed),	Regime	
Interaction	in	International	Law	(2012),	136.		
17	See	Dunoff,	Ibid.		
18	Ibid.,	at	138.	
19	 See	 generally	 A.	 Riles,	 ‘A	 New	 Agenda	 for	 the	 Cultural	 Study	 of	 Law:	 Taking	 on	 the	 Technicalities’,	
(2005)	53	Buffalo	Law	Review	973.	
20	M.	Valverde,	‘Jurisdiction	and	Scale:	Legal	‘Technicalities’	as	Resources	for	Theory’	(2009)	18	(2)	Social	
and	Legal	Studies	139.	
21	E.	Cloatre,	‘Shifting	labels	and	the	fluidity	of	the	'legal’,	in	D.	Cowan	and	D.	Wincott	(eds),	Exploring	the	
legal	in	socio-legal	studies	(2015),	97	at	97.	
22	See	Valverde,	supra	note	20,	at	153.	
we	term,	the	‘socio-legal	adaptation’	of	the	aircraft;	a	type	of	(re)ordering	involving	law,	
legal	 technicalities	 and	 artefacts	 of	 legal	 origin	 that	 in	 this	 case	 were	 focused	 on	
ensuring	the	compatibility	of	 two	distinct	 legal	regimes.23	Thus,	socio-legal	adaptation	
reflects	a	 sociological	 research	approach	 that	 is	open	 to	 the	 complex	entanglement	of	
law	and	the	material	world,	one	that	is	strongly	informed	by	the	Actor-Network	Theory	
rejection	of	explanations	of	the	‘the	social’	which	do	not	sufficiently	account	for	the	role	
of	 ‘non-humans’.	 In	 this	 guise,	 the	 socio-legal	 includes	 the	 material	 world	 and	 by	
extension	‘socio-legal	adaptation’	should	be	understood	as	a	re-ordering	of	the	material	
and	social	worlds.		
Our	 work	 is	 significant	 as	 its	 highlights	 the	 role	 played	 by	 legal	 technicalities	 in	
establishing	 ‘jurisdiction’24	 between	 specialised	 regimes	 of	 international	 law.25	
Furthermore,	 it	demonstrates	 the	assimilation	of	 aviation	 into	 the	 cause	global	health	
security	 through	 the	 instrumentalisation	 of	 the	 aircraft	 and	 its	 crew	 as	 facilitators	 of	
disease	 surveillance.	 Through	 socio-legal	 adaptation,	 uncertainty	 was	 (somewhat)	
diminished	and	a	more	coherent	governance	framework	was	established	for	aviation	in	
the	context	of	the	Ebola	outbreak.	
We	 commence	 our	 analysis	 in	 section	 one	 by	 detailing	 how	 the	 appearance	 of	 SARS	
(Severe	 Acute	 Respiratory	 Syndrome)	 in	 2003	 produced	 a	 paradigm	 shift	 in	 the	
relationship	 between	 aviation	 and	 public	 health.	 SARS	 spread	 to	 23	 countries	 in	 a	
                                                             
23	 Drawing	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 socio-legal	 objects,	 see	 E.	 Cloatre,	 ‘Trips	 and	 pharmaceutical	 patents	 in	
Djibouti:	an	ANT	analysis	of	socio-legal	objects’,	(2008)	17	(2)	Social	&	Legal	Studies	263,	at	263.	
24	See	generally	Valverde,	supra	note	20.	
25	See	generally	ILC	Analytical	Study	2006,	ILC	Study	Group	on	the	Fragmentation	of	International	Law.	
Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	 Arising	 from	 the	 Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	
International	Law;	Report	of	the	Study	Group	of	the	International	Law	Commission,	Finalized	by	Martti	
Koskenniemi.	UN	Doc	A/CN.4/L.682	and	Add.1	and	Corr.	 1.	New	York:	 International	 Law	Commission,	
2006..	
matter	of	days	through	 international	air	 travel26	and	 in	one	case	 it	was	thought	 that	a	
single	 passenger	 infected	 22	 of	 119	 passengers.27	 	We	 accompany	 this	 discussion	 by	
drawing	attention	to	the	literature	on	regime	interactions,	as	well	as	the	potential	role	
of	 legal	 technicalities	 in	 facilitating	coherent	 interactions	between	the	legal	regimes	of	
aviation	and	global	health	security	respectively.	
In	section	two,	we	discuss	in	more	detail	the	role	of	the	technical	in	securing	functional	
and	coherent	regime	inter-operation.	We	demonstrate	how	over	time,	the	legal	regimes	
applicable	 to	 the	 aircraft	 became	 better	 aligned	 through	 the	 employ	 of	 artefacts	 and	
practices	 resulting	 in	 the	 social-legal	 adaptation	 of	 the	 airplane	 to	 the	 threat	 of	
communicable	disease.	This	bridging	work	would,	however,	 come	 to	be	 tested	during	
the	Ebola	outbreak.		
In	section	three,	we	discuss	the	international	response	to	Ebola	and	thereby	reveal	the	
struggle	 both	 within	 international	 organisations	 and	 the	 airline	 industry	 to	 contend	
with	the	disease.	We	explore	socio-legal	adaptations	specific	to	Ebola,	all	of	which	aimed	
to	further	connect	the	plane’s	interior	with	disease	surveillance	systems.		
In	 section	 four,	 we	 demonstrate	 that	 while	 legal	 technicalities	 can	 be	 written	 off	 as	
neutral	 and	 uninteresting,	 they	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 facilitating	 the	 ongoing	
interaction	 between	 the	 applicable	 regimes	 of	 global	 health	 and	 aviation	 during	 the	
Ebola	outbreak.	Consequently,	they	were	instrumental	in	developing	international	law’s	
jurisdiction	on-board	the	plane.	Through	efforts	that	included	those	facilitating	regime	
                                                             
26	See	D.	Fidler,	SARS:	Governance	and	the	Globalisation	of	Disease	(2004),	Chapter	5.	For	further	details	on	
the	role	of	international	air	travel	in	the	spread	of	SARS,	see	WHO,	The	World	Health	Report	2007	A	Safer	
Future:	Global	Public	Health	Security	in	the	21st	Century	(2007),	at	38.	
27	 Air	 Travel	 'Fuelled	 SARS	 Spread'	 BBC	 NEWS	 (Dec.	 17,	 2003),	 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/3329483.stm.	See	also	Ibid.		
interactions,	some	flights	would	take	off	during	the	outbreak.	We	conclude	by	drawing	
five	core	conclusions	from	our	study.		
	
1.	REGIME	INTERACTIONS,	INTERLEGALITY	AND	LEGAL	TOOLS		
Airports	are	a	physical	manifestation	of	legal	regime	interoperation.28	While	parked	on	
the	 runway,	 the	plane	exists	within	 the	bordered	 territory	of	 a	state	and	 is	subject	 to	
national	laws	relating	to	public	health,	customs,	security	and	immigration.	However,	the	
plane	 and	 airport	 also	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 multiple	 international	 legal	 regimes	
including	those	of	the	Chicago	Convention	and	IHR	(2005).	In	this	way,	the	airport	and	
the	 plane	 are	 spaces	 where	 international	 norms	 and	 laws	 cohabit	 and	 interact	 with	
national	 and	 local	 laws	 and	 norms.	 For	 the	 air	 travel	 project	 to	 succeed	 and	 operate	
smoothly,	a	multitude	of	legal	regimes	must	co-function.		
The	appearance	of	SARS	highlighted	the	shortcomings	of	international	law	by	exposing	
a	 gap	 in	 the	 interaction	 of	 the	 regimes	 of	 international	 health	 and	 international	 air	
travel.29	 The	 disease	 subsequently	 drove	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 air	
transport	with	respect	 to	infectious	diseases.30	 Indeed,	such	was	the	magnitude	of	 the	
2003	 outbreak	 that	 it	 acted	 as	 a	 ‘tipping	 point’31	 for	 the	 revision	of	 the	 IHR	 (1969)32	
which	 had	 been	 subject	 to	 extensive	 criticism	 for	 its	 inability	 to	 deal	 with	 new	 and	
emerging	infectious	diseases.	Even	with	the	revision	of	IHR	in	2005,	however,	there	was	
                                                             
28	See	generally	A.	Kesby,	‘The	Shifting	and	Multiple	Border	and	International	Law’,	(2007)	27	(1)	Oxford	
Journal	of	Legal	Studies	101.	
29	See	supra,	notes	26	and	27.	
30	Ibid.		
31	S.	E.	Davies,	A.	Kamradt-Scott	and	S.	Rushton,	Disease	Diplomacy:	International	Norms	and	Global	Health	
Security	(2015),	Chapter	two.		
32	D.	Fidler,	 ‘From	International	Sanitary	Conventions	 to	Global	Health	Security:	The	New	International	
Health	Regulations’,	(2005)	4	(2)	Chinese	Journal	of	International	Law	325,	at	343.	
still	something	of	a	‘gap’	when	it	came	to	governing	a	crucial	component	of	the	aviation	
sector	–	the	interior	of	the	cabin	and	infected	passengers.	There	were	no	prescriptions,	
for	 example,	 within	 the	 IHR	 (2005)	 or	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 on	 the	 internal	
characteristics	aircraft	and	the	governance	of	infected	passengers	on	the	airplane.33		
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Convention,	 the	 ICAO’s	 reaction	 to	 SARS	was	 to	
recognise	that,	‘health	issues	are	becoming	a	consideration	for	some	in	their	decision	to	
fly	or	not.’34	In	2004,	to	ensure	the	mobility	of	planes	during	public	health	threats,	the	
ICAO	reviewed	the	compatibility	of	aviation	standards	with	those	of	public	health.35	At	
that	time,	the	Chicago	Convention	and	the	(as	then	draft)	IHR	(2005)	were	recognised	to	
be	 ‘generally	 synergistic,	 starting	with	 their	 shared	objective	of	 avoiding	unnecessary	
interference	 with,	 respectively,	 air	 transportation	 and	 international	 traffic.’36	 Despite	
this,	a	distinct	normative	gap	between	the	rationalities	underpinning	the	WHO	IHR	and	
                                                             
33	 It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 the	 ICAO	 and	WHO	had	previously	worked	 together	 on	 a	 diverse	
range	of	issues	including	quarantine,	disinsectization	of	aircraft	to	eradicate	vectors	of	disease,	as	well	as	
airport	health	and	sanitary	facilities.	Indeed,	the	IHR	(1969),	applicable	at	the	time	of	SARS,	contained	a	
large	number	of	references	to	aviation	and	international	travel.	The	public	health	risks	of	international	air	
travel	 were	 also	 given	 specific	 expression	 in	 Article	 14	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Convention.	 The	 extent	 of	
collaboration	 between	 the	 ICAO	 and	 WHO	 was	 such	 that	 the	 ICAO	 was	 the	 only	 intergovernmental	
organisation	to	participate	in	a	1995	informal	WHO	consultation	on	revision	of	the	latter’s	International	
Health	Regulations.	Despite	such	cooperation,	however,	in	the	period	before	SARS,	only	limited	progress	
was	 made	 in	 terms	 of	 regulating	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 aircraft	 to	 prevent	 the	 spread	 of	 communicable	
disease.		See	generally,	L.	C.	S.	Budd,	M.	Bell	and	T.	Brown,	‘Of	Plagues,	planes	and	politics:	controlling	the	
global	spread	of	infectious	diseases	by	air’,	(2009)	28	(7)	Political	Geography	426,	at	429;	B.	J.	Plotkin	and	
A.M.	 Kimbal,	 ‘Designing	 an	 International	 Policy	 and	 Legal	 Framework	 for	 the	 Control	 of	 Emerging	
Infectious	Diseases:	First	Steps’,	(1997)	3	(1)	Emerging	Infectious	Disease	1;	R.	Abeyratne	 ‘International	
Responsibility	 in	 Preventing	 the	 Spread	 of	 Communicable	 Diseases	 Through	 Air	 Carriage	 –	 The	 SARS	
Crisis’,	(2003)	30	(53)	Transportation	Law	Journal	53.	
34	The	ICAO	is	a	UN	specialised	agency,	established	by	States	in	1944	to	manage	the	administration	and	
governance	of	 the	Convention	on	 International	Civil	Aviation	 (Chicago	Convention).	The	quote	is	 taken	
from	the	preamble	to	ICAO	2004	Resolution	A35-12:	Protection	of	the	health	of	passengers	and	crews	and	
prevention	of	the	spread	of	communicable	disease	through	international	travel.	On	the	economic	impact	
of	 SARS	 for	 the	 airline	 industry,	 see	 R.	 Abeyratne,	Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	 Aviation:	 A	
Commentary	(2013)	at	218	–	219.	
35	ICAO,	Ibid.		
36	Review	and	Approval	of	Proposed	Amendments	to	the	International	Health	Regulations:	Relations	with	
Other	International	Instruments,	WHO	Doc.	A/IHR/IGWG/INF.DOC./1,	30	September	2004,	1-10.		
the	 Chicago	 Convention	was	 apparent.	While	 the	 two	 regimes	 certainly	 overlapped,37	
they	had	evolved	 largely	 in	parallel,	each	operating	through	distinct	personnel,	norms	
and	 logics.	 Hence	 despite	 areas	 of	 convergence	 and	 overlap,	 they	were,	 for	 the	most	
part,	spatially	and	functionally	distinct.		
On	 the	one	 hand	 the	 IHR	 (2005)	 are	 concerned	with	 global	 health	 security38	 through	
shoring	up	 surveillance.39	 The	 IHR	 relies	 on	 the	 ‘social	 sorting’40	 of	 the	 sick	 from	 the	
healthy	and	emphasises	the	importance	of	core	capacities	for	‘disease	surveillance	and	
response.’41	 This	 requires	 the	 development	 of	 ‘generic	 capacities	 that	 will	 enable	
responses	to	a	broad	spectrum	of	contingencies’.42	With	an	emphasis	on	preparedness	
the	 IHR	 are	 concerned	 not	 so	 much	 with	 population	 health,	 but	 rather,	 ‘imagining,	
anticipating,	 and	 rehearsing	 potential	 responses	 to	 emergent	 diseases	 that	 have	 the	
capacity	 to	 evade	 detection.’43	 Preparedness	 efforts	 are	 thus	 focused	on	 protection	 of	
what	Collier	and	Lakoff	have	referred	to	as	‘vital	systems’	which	includes	the	transport	
                                                             
37	Supra,	note	33.	
38	 See	 WHO,	 ‘Report	 of	 the	 Ebola	 Interim	 Assessment	 Panel	 -	 final	 report’	 (2015)	
www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/ebola-panel-report/en/,	at	5;	 ‘The	International	Health	
Regulations	were	revised	a	decade	ago	in	order	to	better	protect	global	health	security	–	specifically,	with	
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39	Surveillance	is	defined	in	the	IHR	(2005),	Art.	1.1,	as,	‘the	systematic	ongoing	collection,	collation	and	
analysis	of	data	for	public	health	purposes	and	the	timely	dissemination	of	public	health	information	for	
assessment	 and	public	 health	 response	as	 necessary.’	For	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 surveillance	 function	 of	 the	
IHR,	 see	 generally	G.	 Blouin	Genest,	 ‘World	Health	Organization	 and	disease	 surveillance:	 Jeopardizing	
global	public	health?’,	(2015)	19	(6)	Health	595.		
40	See	K.	Barker,	‘Biosecurity:	securing	circulations	from	the	microbe	to	the	macrocosm’,	(2015)	181	(4)	
The	Geographical	Journal	357,	at	358.	
41	A.	Lakoff,	‘Two	regimes	of	Global	Health’,	(2010)	1	(1)	Humanity	59,	at	72.	
42	A.	Ingram,	‘Biosecurity	and	the	international	response	to	HIV/AIDS’,	(2010)	42	(3)	Area	293,	at	296.	See	
also	 A.	 Warren,	 M.	 Bell	 and	 L.	 Budd,	 ‘Using	 event-based	 surveillance	 to	 manage	 emerging	 infectious	
disease’	 in	 K.	 Ball	 and	 L.	 Snider	 (eds.),	 The	 Surveillance-Industrial	 Complex:	 A	 Political	 Economy	 of	
Surveillance	(2013),	47.	
43	 N.	 Stephenson,	 ‘Emerging	 Infectious	 Disease/Emerging	 forms	 of	 Biological	 Sovereignty’	 (2011)	 36	
Science,	Technology	and	Human	Values	616,	621.		
sector.44	 This	 can	 be	 contrasted	with	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	which	 has	 traditionally	
focused	 on	 the	 prevention	 of	 accidents	 and	 ensuring	 passenger	 health	 and	 safety.45		
Prior	 to	 SARS,	 the	 ICAO	 was	 mostly	 interested	 in	 the	 ‘human	 factors’	 dimension	 of	
aviation	 health46	 with,	 for	 example,	 efforts	 to	 ban	 smoking	 in-flight47	 derived	 from	
ICAO’s	passenger	safety	mandate.	
In	 summary,	 we	 find	 two	 different	 legal	 regimes,	 while	 sharing	 the	 objective	 of	
maintaining	 international	 travel,	 are	 nevertheless	 epistemically	 distinct.	 This	
distinctiveness	highlights	a	number	of	 challenges	which	 could	give	 rise	 to	governance	
issues	 including;	 functional	 overlap,48	 normative	 difference,	 and	 the	 potential	 for	
jurisdictional	uncertainty.49	With	regards	to	the	latter,	for	example,	we	can	consider	an	
in-flight	 incidence	 of	 infectious	 disease	 as	 an	 issue	 pertaining	 to	 international	 health	
security.	 In	 some	 circumstances,	 however,	 it	 will	 be	 a	 passenger	 safety	 concern.	
                                                             
44	S.	J.	Collier	and	A.	Lakoff,	‘Vital	Systems	security’	(2006)	ARC	Working	Paper	No.	2,	2	February	2006;	
cited	in	Stephenson,	Ibid.,	at	621	–	622.	See	also	S.	Opitz,	 ‘Regulating	the	Epidemic	Space:	the	nomos	of	
global	circulation’,	(2015)	19	(2)	Journal	of	International	Relations	and	Development	1,	at	10,	who	argues	
that,	‘the	IHR	contain	no	substantial	allusion	to	individual	health,	the	figure	of	the	individual	person	who	
is	sick	and	needs	care	is,	for	the	most	part,	absent.	On	the	other	hand,	and	even	more	curiously,	the	IHR	
also	refrain	from	concerning	themselves	with	the	health	of	the	population...’		
45	 The	 preamble	 to	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 states	 that	 governments	 have	 agreed	 on	 ‘principles	 and	
arrangements	in	order	that	 international	civil	aviation	may	be	developed	in	a	safe	and	orderly	manner	
and	that	the	international	air	transport	services	may	be	established	on	a	basis	of	equality	of	opportunity.’	
See	 generally	 Abeyratne,	supra	 note	 34,	 at	 217;	 commenting	 that	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 aviation	 context,	
‘international	 responsibility	 in	 the	carriage	 of	 persons	extends	 only	 as	 far	 as	 the	 obligation	 to	 prevent	
injury,	wounding	or	death,	and	not	to	the	physical	or	mental	well-being	of	a	person.’	
46	See	generally	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization.	Resolution	A33-12:	Harmonization	of	drug	and	
alcohol	testing	programmes,	2001.		
47	 	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	Organization.	 Resolution	A29-15:	 Smoking	 restrictions	 on	 international	
passenger	flights.	October	8,	1992.	
48	On	this	issue,	it	is	clear	that	while	‘treaty	overlap	indicates	an	engaged	global	community,	it	also	creates	
problems	of	inefficiency,	contradiction,	lost	opportunities,	and	sometimes	even	‘sclerosis.’	S.	Jinnah,	Post-
Treaty	Politics:	Secretariat	Influence	in	Global	Environmental	Governance	(2014),	5.	
49	 See,	 for	 example,	 See	 ICAO/	 A.	 Evans,	 ‘Update	 on	 CAPSCA	 (Collaborative	 Arrangement	 for	 the	
Prevention	and	Management	of	Public	Health	Events	in	Civil	Aviation)’,	(2013)	available	at		
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Sometimes	it	will	be	both.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	resolve	how	the	two	domains	of	
law	inter-operate.		
1.1	Regime	interoperation		
The	wide	array	of	 legal	regimes	governing	specific	 issue	areas,	often	with	overlapping	
competences,	 has	 attracted	 much	 by	 way	 of	 academic	 comment.50	 The	 so-called	
fragmentation	of	international	law	is	seen	as	a	response	to	the	increased	specialisation	
and	 complexity	 of	 international	 affairs.51	 Nonetheless	 there	 exists	 a	 general	
presumption	 against	 normative	 conflict	 in	 international	 law.52	 This	 is	 given	 effect	
through	 techniques	 and	 agreements53	 aimed	 at	 ensuring	 harmonious	 legal	
interpretation	and	elaboration.		
At	the	doctrinal	level,	rules	such	as	lex	posterior	and	lex	specialis	have	been	developed	to	
minimise	 inter-systemic	conflicts	between	different	 international	 treaties.54	Such	rules	
or	 techniques	 may,	 however,	 be	 unsuited	 to	 the	 task	 of	 dealing	 with	 ‘relational	
interactions’	between	 international	 regimes	which	exercise	 concurrent	authority	over	
actions	or	events.55		In	practice,	when	decision	makers	encounter	regime	conflicts,	‘they	
tend	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 ad	 hoc	 political	 bargains	 rather	 than	 by	 an	 application	 of	
                                                             
50	See,	for	example,	J	Dunoff,	‘The	WTO	in	Transition:	Of	Constituents,	Competence	and	Coherence’	(2001)	
33	Geo	Wash	 Int’lL	 Rev	 979;	 V	 Lowe,	 ‘The	Role	 of	 Law	 in	 International	 Politics’,	 in	M	Byers	 (ed.),	The	
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51	 See,	e.g.	G.	Abi-Saab,	 ‘Fragmentation	or	Unification:	Some	Concluding	Remarks’	 (1999)	31	New	York	
University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	919.	
52	See	generally	ILC	Analytical	Study,	supra	note	25.	
53	Vienna	Convention	on	 the	Law	of	Treaties,	United	Nations	Treaty	Series	331	(May	23,	1969):	1155;	
Article	31	(3)	(c).	
54	 See	 generally	 N	 Krisch,	 Beyond	 Constitutionalism:	 The	 Pluralist	 Structure	 of	 Postnational	 Law	 (OUP,	
2012)	Chapter	8.	
55	Dunoff,	supra	note	16,	at	138.	
blackletter	 principles.’56	 Likewise	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission’s	 report	 on	 the	
fragmentation	of	 international	law	highlighted	the	limits	of	public	international	law’s	
response	to	conflict,	suggesting	that	this	may	at	times	be	more	a	political	task.57	Johns,	
however,	 has	 challenged	 this	 view,	 pointing	 to	 the	 repetoire	 of	 tools	 and	 techniques	
deployed	by	international	lawyers	in	this	space.58	
Indeed	 international	 lawyers	 have	 begun	 to	 analyse,	 ‘the	 positive	 contribution	 of	 (…)	
new	 techniques	which	 courts,	 tribunals,	 and	 other	 actors	 have	 developed	 in	 order	 to	
coordinate	 the	 various	 subfields	 of	 international	 law.’59	 Accordingly,	 an	 emerging	
scholarship	 on	 ‘relational	 regime	 interactions’	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 far	 being	
conflictual	in	nature,	many	regime	differences	are	resolved	cooperatively.60	The	pursuit	
of	 functional	 coherence	 between	 regimes	 does	 not,	 however,	 erode	 differences	 of	
norms,	 rationalities	 and	 authority	 between	 them.	 Rather,	 the	 focus	 of	 scholarship	 on	
relational	 regime	 interactions	 is	 the,	 ‘question	 of	 how	 different	 regimes	 and	 norms	
could	work	to	support	each	other,	or,	 in	other	words,	how	to	achieve	synergies.’61	For	
example,	 Fishcer-Lescano	 and	 Teubner,	 in	 drawing	 attention	 to	 regime	 interaction,	
                                                             
56	 C.	 J.	 Borgen,	 ‘Resolving	 treaty	 conflicts’,	 (2005)	 37	 9	 (3)	The	 George	Washington	 International	 Law	
Review,	573,	at	605.	
57	ILC	Study,	supra	note	25,	para.	488.	
58	F.	Johns,	Non-Legality	in	International	Law	Unruly	Law	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2013)	221.	
59	 A.	 Peters,	 ‘The	 refinement	 of	 international	 law:	 From	 fragmentation	 to	 regime	 interaction	 and	
politicization’	 (2017)	 15	 (3)	 International	 Journal	 of	 Constitutional	 Law	 671,	 672.	 See	 generally	 M.	 A.	
Young	(ed),	Regime	Interaction	in	International	Law	(2012).	
60	 See,	 for	 example	 H.	 van	 Asselt,	 ‘Managing	 the	 Fragmentation	 of	 International	 Environmental	 Law:	
Forests	at	the	Intersection	of	the	Climate	and	Biodiversity	Regimes,’	(2012)	44	(4)	New	York	University	
Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics,	1205.	‘Relational	regime	interactions’	derives	from	Dunoff,	supra	
note	16,	at	138.	
61	van	Asselt,	ibid.	
focus	 on	 the	 potential	 for	 an	 ‘operative	 inter-legality’,	 which	 may	 exist	 even	 in	 the	
absence	of	normative	consistency.62	
D’Sousa	Santos	originally	coined	the	term	inter-legality	to	describe	how	different	legal	
orders	 intersect	 but	 find	 coherence.	 This	 legal	 interplay	 is	 ‘a	 highly	 dynamic	 process	
because	 the	 different	 legal	 spaces	 are	 non-synchronic	 and	 thus	 result	 in	 uneven	 and	
unstable	 mixings	 of	 legal	 codes.’63	 	 Regime	 interactions	 are	 part	 of	 the	 work	 that	
produces	 interlegality.	 Through	 this	 process,	 law’s	 subjects,	 including	 communicable	
diseases,	 are	 formed	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 different	 legal	 regimes.	 Their	 interactions	
establish	and	consolidate	 the	 scope	of	 international	 law	which	 in	 turn	 intersects	with	
other	legal	orders,	including	at	the	national	and	local	scale.		
Interlegality,	 according	 to	 Valverde,	 is	 also	 a	 product	 of	 technical	 legal	 work,	 the	
invisible	cooperation	that	also	determines	the	where,	the	who,	the	what	and	the	how	of	
legal	 governance.64	 What	 makes	 a	 particular	 issue	 a	 matter	 for	 public	 health	 law	 or	
aviation	 law	 is,	 in	 turn,	 a	 product	 of	 separating	 and	 sorting	 legal	 orders,	 the	 legal	
machinery	of	jurisdiction.	Valverde’s	reading	of	jurisdiction	portrays	inter-legality	as	a	
domino	effect.	Where	domains	of	 law	overlap	or	are	actively	brought	 together,65	 their	
seemingly	 inevitable	 interoperation	 should	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 product	 of	 deliberate	
technical	legal	governance.66		
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63	B.	de	Sousa	Santos,	 ‘Law:	A	Map	of	Misreading.	Toward	a	Postmodern	Conception	of	Law’,	(1987)	14	
(3)	Journal	of	Law	and	Society	279,	at	298.		
64	Valverde,	supra	note	20,	at	144.	
65	 see	D.	Burchardt,	 ‘Intertwinement	of	Legal	Spaces	 in	 the	Transnational	Legal	Sphere’,	 (2017)	30	 (2)	
Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 305.	 See	 generally,	 J.	 P.	 Trachtman,	 ‘Institutional	 Linkage:	
Transcending	“Trade	and”’,	(2002)	96	American	Journal	of	International	Law	77,	at	80	to	the	effect	that,	
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66	Valverde,	supra	note	20,	at,	145.	
To	 understand	 the	 workings	 or	 the	 machinery	 of	 jurisdiction	 Valverde	 suggests,	
‘turning-away	from	high	theory	and	toward	the	‘technicalities’	of	law’.67	Riles	also	helps	
us	 towards	 an	 analytical	 posture	 from	 where	 the	 mechanics	 of	 inter-treaty	 regime	
interactions	 can	 be	 appreciated	 and	 analyzed	 from	 a	 legal	 perspective.	 Her	 work	
illuminates	the	role	of	the	technical,	directing	attention	to	the	mundane	tools	of	law.68	
According	to	Riles,	legal	technicalities	are	perceived	as	being,	‘only	a	tool,	nothing	more,	
and	can	be	used	by	anyone	anywhere	for	any	purpose.’69	In	this	sense,	legal	technique	is	
inherently	practical;	it	is	a	‘series	of	problem-solving	methods,	as	opposed	to	theories,	a	
way	of	disposing	of	actual	regulatory	problems,	or	disputes,	or	legal	puzzles.’70	Because	
of	 this	 problem-solving	 focus,	 together	 with	 (the	 appearance	 at	 least	 of)	 political	
neutrality,	 legal	 technicalities	 are	 capable	 of	 being	 deployed	 regardless	 of	 their	
contextual	 setting.	 Furthermore,	 the	 obviousness	 of	 their	 function	 often	 means	 that	
lawyers	fail	to	appreciate	their	importance.71	
Riles	 suggests	 that	 legal	 technicalities	 include	 everything	 from	 legal	 actors,	 problem	
solving	paradigms,	ideologies,	the	form	of	technical	legal	doctrine	and	argumentation.72	
Far	 from	 being	 inert,	 they	 often	 produce	 effects	 through	 material	 artefacts	 and	
practices.73	 Bringing	 such	 effects	 into	 view	 also	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 the	 potential	 of	 the	
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70	Ibid.,	69	
71	A.	Riles,	 ‘Afterword:	A	Method	More	Than	a	Subject?’	 in	D.	Cowan	and	D.	Wincott	(eds),	Exploring	the	
legal	in	socio-legal	studies	(2015),	257	at	259.	
72	See	Riles,	supra	note	19,	at	976.	
73	See	generally	A.	Riles,	‘Models	and	Documents:	Artifacts	of	International	Legal	Knowledge’,	(1999)	48	
(4)	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	805.	
technical	to	act	as	a	protagonist,	not	merely	as	a	tool	that	faithfully	mediates	the	intent	
of	its	user.74		
Rather	 than	 choosing	 between	 ‘ad	 hoc	 political	 bargains’	 or	 the	 ‘application	 of	
blackletter	 principles’	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 the	 encounter	 of	 multiple	 treaty	
regimes,	 this	study	 introduces	the	role	played	of	 legal	 technicalities.	We	examine	how	
they	feature	in	facilitating	interactions	between	the	legal	regimes	of	aviation	and	global	
health	 security	 respectively.	 This	 untold	 story	 of	 international	 law	 –	 the	 role	 of	 the	
technical	in	securing	coherent	and	synergistic	regime	interactions	–	contributes	to	the	
growing	literature	on	relational	regime	interactions.			
In	 the	 remainder	 of	 our	 paper,	 we	 use	 the	 term	 legal	 technicalities	 and	 legal	 tools	
interchangeably	when	 in	keeping	with	Riles’	definition.	We	 refer	 to	 the	materials	 that	
legal	technicalities	act	through	as	legal	artefacts;	the	quasi-legal	objects	or	what	Cloatre	
calls	socio-legal	objects.75		
	
2.	A	TALE	OF	THE	TECHNICAL			
As	demonstrated	above,	SARS	drew	attention	to	uncertainty	at	the	international	level	on	
how	 to	 deal	with	 the	 threat	 of	 infectious	 disease	 spread	 by	 air	 travel.	 Responding	 to	
such	 concerns	would	 require	 ‘bridging	work’	between	 the	 applicable	 regimes.	 In	 this	
section,	 we	 discuss	 the	 form	 and	 function	 of	 such	 bridging	 work,	 paying	 particular	
attention	 to	 the	 role	of	 the	 technical	 therein.	 As	we	will	 show,	 the	 legal	 technicalities	
employed	 to	 perform	 regime	 bridging	 work	 operated	 under	 a	 presumption	 of	
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compatibility.76	 These	 technicalities	 included	 the	 doctrinal	 technique	 of	 instrumental	
cross-referencing77	through	to	the	use	of	institutional	coordination	linkages.78	By	dint	of	
these	 legal	 tools,	 the	governance	of	 infected	airline	passengers	 could	be	progressively	
integrated	into	the	existing	legal	orders.	
As	 we	 elucidate	 below,	 the	 resulting	 interactions	 between	 the	 ICAO	 and	 WHO	were	
juris-generative,79		and	resulted	in	the	elaboration	of	‘new	international	norms’80	for	air	
travel	 during	 public	 health	 emergencies.81	 Accordingly,	 over	 time,	 the	 legal	 regimes	
applicable	to	the	craft	became	better	aligned	through	the	development	of	artefacts	and	
practices	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 social-legal	 adaptation	 of	 the	 airplane	 to	 the	 threat	 of	
communicable	disease.	However,	as	we	discuss	in	section	three,	this	arrangement	came	
under	strain	with	the	outbreak	of	Ebola	in	West	Africa	in	2014.	
2.1	 Close	 Encounters	 of	 a	 Regime	 Kind:	 Cross-referencing	 and	 coordination	
linkages	
Cross-referencing	may	operate	as	a	simple	 legal	 technique	to	ensure	and	promote	the	
reconciliation	 of	 overlapping	 legal	 domains.82	 	 In	 addition	 to	 bolstering	 coherence	
claims,	cross-referencing	may	create	a	presumption	of	compatibility	between	the	norms	
and	policies	of	connected	regimes.	83		
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In	 the	 aftermath	of	 SARS,	 the	 legal	 technique	of	 cross-referencing	was	utilised	 by	 the	
ICAO	through	 its	enactment	of	a	series	of	updates	to	 its	Standards	and	Recommended	
Practices	 (SARPS)84	 under	 the	 Chicago	 Convention.85	 The	 updates	 referenced	 the	 IHR	
(2005)86	 and	 detailed,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 need	 to	 bolster	 preparedness	 by	
establishing	facilities	at	airports	to	contend	with	public	health	emergencies	as	well	as	to	
develop	a	National	Health	Plan	to	deal	with	such	events.87	These	references	to	the	IHR	
by	 the	 ICAO	were	mirrored	 by	 the	 extensive	 reference	 to	 aviation	 in	 the	 IHR	 (2005),	
providing	 implicit	 recognition	 of	 the	 normative	 and	 functional	domain	 of	 the	 Chicago	
Convention	and	the	ICAO.88		
In	addition	to	cross-referencing,	coordination	linkages	would	play	an	important	role	in	
resolving	potential	frictions	and	ensuring	operational	coherence	between	the	applicable	
regimes.	 From	 ex	 ante	 treaty	 provisions	 permitting	 multilateral	 coordination,89	 to	
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informal	configurations	facilitated	by	memoranda	of	understanding	or	cooperation	with	
different	 secretariats,	 treaty	 organs	 and	 international	 organisations,	 linkages	 feature	
heavily	in	the	practice	of	regime	interactions.	They	can	be	also	considered	as	a	discrete	
legal	 technique	 for	 the	promotion	of	 coherence	 in	 rules	and	 implementation,	 and	can,	
through	the	production	of	decisions,	guidance	and	policies,	involve	an	element	of	treaty	
interpretation.90	
In	 2006,	 a	 decision	 was	 taken	 to	 establish	 a	 ‘coordinating	 group’	 of	 representatives	
from,	among	others,	the	WHO,	International	Air	Transport	Association	(IATA),	Airports	
Council	International	(ACI)	and	the	ICAO	to	keep	the	emergency	guidelines	for	States	up	
to	 date.91	 This	 was	 followed	with	 the	 development	 by	 the	 ICAO	 of	 the	 Collaborative	
Arrangement	 for	 the	 Prevention	 and	 Management	 of	 Public	 Health	 Events	 in	 Civil	
Aviation	(CAPSCA).92		
CAPSCA	is	tasked	to	enable	‘cooperation	amongst	civil	aviation	authorities,	public	health	
authorities,	 airports,	 air	 traffic	 services,	 and	 airlines’	 to	 facilitate	 an	 international	
response	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 communicable	 diseases	 through	 air	 travel.93	 	While	 not	 all	
ICAO	 Member	 States	 have	 joined	 CAPSCA,94	 part	 of	 its	 remit	 pertains	 to	 developing	
guidelines	 for	 states,	 airport	 authorities	 and	 airlines.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 performs	 the	
important	 function	 of	 ‘overlap	 manager’	 between	 different	 domains	 of	 law.95	 In	
addition,	 it	provides	 a	 ‘coordination	 linkage’	 between	 the	 regimes	of	 the	 IHR	 and	 the	
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91	ICAO	surpra	note	88;	at	para	2.1.3.2.	
92	Ibid.,	para	2.1.3.4.	
93	CAPSCA,	‘Introduction’,	available	at	http://www.capsca.org/IntroandObjectivesWeb.pdf	
94	 See	 CAPSCA/Ansa	 Jordaan,	 ‘CAPSCA	 Future	 Developments’,	 (3	 October	 2016)	 available	 at	
www.capsca.org/Meetings/Americas2016/D3-P5.pdf	at	10.		
95	On	overlap	management	more	generally	in	international	law,	see	Jinnah,	supra	note	48.		
Chicago	Convention	and	also	helps	secure	the	ongoing	enrolment	of	the	private	airline	
industry	 into	 public	 health	 efforts.	 The	 IATA	 (a	 private	 sector	 organisation	 for	 the	
world’s	airlines),	for	example,	published	its	own	heavily	cross-referenced	versions	of	its	
operational	standards	therein.	We	can	see	this	in	its	guidance	for	cabin	crew	in	cases	of	
suspected	communicable	disease,	which	advises	that,		
(a)s	 soon	 as	 possible,	 advise	 the	 captain	 of	 the	 situation	 because	 he/she	 is	
required	 by	 the	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	 Organization	 regulations	 (ICAO	
Annex	 9,	 Chapter	 8,	 and	 paragraph	 8.15)	 and	 the	 World	 Health	 Organization	
International	 Health	 Regulations	 (WHO	 IHR	 2005,	 Article	 28(4))	 to	 report	 the	
suspected	case(s)	to	air	traffic	control.96		
Accordingly,	we	can	begin	to	appreciate	the	result	of	cross-referencing	and	coordination	
linkages	 between	 the	 ICAO	 and	 the	WHO;	 not	 only	was	 the	 scenario	 of	 the	 infectious	
passenger	 integrated	 into	 the	 existing	 legal	 orders,	 but	 this	 approach	 was	 also	
embraced	by	 the	private	 sector.	As	we	explore	below,	 this	would	 result	 in	 socio-legal	
adaptation	 of	 the	 aircraft	 interior	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 infectious	 disease,	 a	 process	 that	
reveals	the	juris-generative	character	of	relational	regime	encounters.97		
2.2.	The	aircraft	and	socio-legal	adaptation		
As	a	consequence	of	the	coordination	linkages	established	between	the	ICAO,	the	WHO	
and	 the	 IATA,	 two	 modifications	 to	 the	 SARPs	 were	 enacted	 which	 are	 especially	
important	 to	 the	adaptation	of	 the	airplane	to	communicable	disease	threats.	The	 first	
                                                             
96	 IATA,	 ‘Suspected	 Communicable	 Disease	 –	 Guidelines	 for	 Cabin	 Crew’	 (March	 2015)	 available	 at	
www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety/health/Documents/health-guidelines-cabin-crew.pdf,	at	para.	14.		
97	In	this	vein,	see	Dunoff,	supra	note	16,	at	138.	
was	the	creation	of	a	‘Passenger	Locator	Form’	in	2007,98	followed	by	the	development	
of	 a	 Universal	 Precaution	 Kit	 in	 2009.99	 In	 respect	 of	 the	 Passenger	 Locator	 Form,	
‘adequate	stocks’	of	the	form	were	to	be	kept	on-board	aircrafts	to	enable	the	gathering	
of	information	on	passengers’	itineraries	and	contacts.100	This	would	mean	that	airlines	
could	avail	of	the	form	to	assist	in	tracing	exposed	person(s),	‘whenever	they	suspect	a	
communicable	disease	on-board	a	flight.’101		
Universal	Precaution	Kits	were	recommended	for	all	aircraft	for	managing	possible	on-
board	communicable	disease	 incidents.102	The	kit	was	 to	 contain	essential	 equipment	
for	 crew	 members	 to	 safely	 deal	 with	 passengers	 displaying	 symptoms	 of	
communicable	 diseases	 listed	 in	 the	 IHR	 (2005).	 Included	 were	 personal	 protective	
equipment,	 absorbent	 powder	 to	 mop	 up	 fluids,	 germicidal	 disinfectant,	 biohazard	
disposal	bags	and	a	thermometer.103		
These	 developments	 also	 complemented	 the	 pre-existing	 mandate	 in	 Article	 38	 IHR	
(2005)	 which	 requires	 the	 airplane’s	 crew	 to	 complete	 and	 submit,	 if	 required,	
information	 on,	 ‘health	 conditions	 on	 board	 during	 an	 international	 voyage	 and	 any	
health	measure	applied	to	the	aircraft.’104	The	declaration	lists	key	symptoms	associated	
with	 communicable	 disease	 transmission	 such	 as	 persistent	 coughing,	 impaired	
breathing,	 persistent	 diarrhoea,	 persistent	 vomiting	 and	 bleeding	 without	 previous	
injury.	 This	 notification	 process	 was	 intended	 to	 bring	 the	 aircraft	 within	 the	 IHR’s	
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99	Ibid.,	Ann.	6	
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102	Chicago	Convention,	Ann.	6,	Chapter	6.2.2	
103	Chicago	Convention,	Ann.	6,	Chapter	6.2.2;	Attachment	B,	2.2.		
104	Ibid.	Ann.	9.		
surveillance	 infrastructure	 by	 acting	 as	 a	 sentinel105	 	 for	 national	 public	 health	
authorities	to	activate	a	response.		
While	the	role	of	the	Declaration	form	was	clear,	airline	crew	required	direction	on	how	
to	 manage	 the	 Passenger	 Locator	 Form	 and	 the	 Universal	 Precaution	 Kit.	 The	 IATA	
would	prove	instrumental	in	this	regard,	recognising	that	cabin	crew	are	not	medically	
qualified	 and	 providing	 guidelines	 on	 how	 to	 deal	 in-flight	 with	 passengers	
demonstrating	the	symptoms	listed	in	the	IHR	(2005).106	 In	 fifteen	steps,	 the	 IATA	set	
out	how	symptomatic	passengers	should	be	isolated,	designated	a	lavatory,	and	advised	
on	 ‘respiratory	etiquette.’107	 Instructions	were	also	provided	on	using	 the	 contents	of	
the	Universal	Precaution	Kit	 including	an	 impermeable	apron	 to	prevent	 contact	with	
bodily	fluids.	Lastly,	the	IATA	guidance	provided	details	on	contact	tracing,	advising	that	
all	adjacent	passengers	be	asked	to	complete	a	Passenger	Locator	Form	and	air	 traffic	
control	 notified	 so	 that	 the	 public	 health	 authority	 at	 destination	 can	 be	 alerted	 in	
accordance	with	IHR	(2005).108		
The	IATA	guidance	was	shaped	by	the	materiality	and	architecture	of	the	plane	as	only,	
‘travellers	seated	in	the	same	row,	2	rows	in	front	and	2	rows	behind	the	sick	traveller	
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106	The	IATA	has	been	active	in	this	domain	since	2005;	see	N.	P.	Dowdall,	A.	D.	Evans	and	C.	Thibeault,	
‘Air	Travel	and	TB:	An	Airline	Perspective’,	(2010)	8	(2)	Travel	Medicine	and	Infectious	Disease	96,	100	-	
and	has	updated	its	guidance	periodically;	see	International	Air	Transport	Association	(IATA),	‘Suspected	
Communicable	 Disease-Health	 Guidelines	 for	 Cabin	 Crew’,	 (2011)	 available	 at	
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96.	
107	E.g.	‘Store	soiled	items	(used	tissues,	face	masks,	oxygen	mask	and	tubing,	linen,	pillows,	blankets,	seat	
pocket	items,	etc.)	in	a	biohazard	bag.’	
108	IHR	(2005),	Art.	28.6	
[were]	to	complete	a	passenger	locator	card.’109	While	cabin	air	is	recirculated,	it	is	also	
filtered	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 disease	 spread.110	 The	 downward	 flow	 of	 filtered	 air	
created	by	a	standard	ventilation	system	invisibly	segregates	symptomatic	passengers	
so	 that	 the	 Passenger	 Locator	 Form	 was	 only	 required	 in	 a	 two	 seat	 radius	 of	 the	
symptomatic	passenger.111	Through	these	interactions,	new	boundaries	for	sorting	and	
segregating	 were	 established	 with	 the	 guidance	 positioning	 materials	 and	 practices	
around	 bodily	 fluids.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 interior	 of	 the	 aircraft	 became	 progressively	
engaged	with	the	IHR	(2005)	and	its	surveillance	processes.	
The	above	socio-legal	adaption	not	only	linked	two	seemingly	distinct	legal	domains	but	
also	 further	 enrolled	 the	 private	 sector	 via	 the	 IATA.	 The	 legal	 ‘fault	 lines’	 of	 this	
cooperation	were,	however,	apparent.	As	the	IATA	made	clear,	 ‘(t)he	development	and	
execution	 of	measures	 to	 combat	 public	 health	 emergencies	 are	 the	 responsibility	 of	
states	 through	 their	 public	 health	 authorities,	 not	 airlines.’112	 Hence,	 while	 the	 IATA	
participated	 in	 CAPSCA	 and	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Passenger	 Locator	 Form	 it	
nevertheless	 ‘always	 considered	 (the	 Passenger	 Locator	 Form)	 to	 be	 an	 interim	
measure	 that	 should	 eventually	 be	 replaced	 by	 an	 electronic	 method	 under	 the	
responsibility	of	public	health	authorities.’113	Despite	this	pushback,	the	significance	of	
the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	in	disease	surveillance	cannot	be	underestimated.	
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110	WHO,	‘Tuberculosis	and	Air	Travel:	Guidelines	for	Prevention	and	Control:	Cabin	Air	Quality’	(2008),	
available	at	www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK143720/.		
111	 See	 ECDC,	 ‘Risk	 Assessment	 Guidelines	 for	 Diseases	 Transmitted	 on	 Aircraft’	 (2009)	
‘https://ecdc.europa.eu/sites/portal/files/media/en/publications/Publications/1012_GUI_RAGIDA_2.pdf
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112	 IATA,	 ‘IATA	 Guidance	 Note	 on	 Ebola’	 (August	 2015)	
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/safety/health/Documents/ebola-comm-0815.pdf			
113	 Airsan,	 ‘Contact	 Tracing	 –	 Collaboration	 between	 the	 Public	 Health	 and	 the	 Aviation	 Sector’	 (May	
2015)	
http://www.airsan.eu/Portals/0/docs/AIRSAN_Guidance%20Document_Contact%20Tracing_May2015.p
df	at	11.		
Accordingly,	the	combination	of	these	seemingly	mundane	legal	tools	and	practices	has	
led	 to,	 ‘fundamental	 epistemological	 shifts’114	 whereby	 the	 rationalities	 underpinning	
the	system	of	global	health	security	are	increasingly	being	de-territorialised	and	applied	
to	aviation.	As	such,	this	demonstrates	how	the	‘global	binary’	whereby	health	security	
is	separated	from	other	fields	is	diminishing,115	as	a	wider	array	actors	are	assimilated	
into	the	field	of	global	health	security.116		
2.3	Summations		
Cross	 referencing	 and	 coordination	 linkages	 between	 the	 legal	 regimes	 of	 the	 WHO,	
ICAO	 and	 IATA	 and	 others	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 materials,	 procedures	 and	
processes	which	in	themselves	performed	bridging	work	between	the	relevant	regimes.	
This	facilitated	the	socio-legal	adaptation	of	the	aircraft;	namely,	the	import	of	protocols	
and	 the	 Universal	 Precaution	 Kit	 into	 the	 aircraft	 cabin.	 These	 socio-legal	 objects	
assisted	 in	 the	 constitution	of	 international	 law’s	 jurisdiction;	 that	 is,	 the	operation	of	
different	 legal	 regimes	 and	 their	 boundaries.117	 Among	 other	 things,	 this	 helped	 to	
resolve	how	surveillance	(IHR)	and	safety	(ICAO)	efforts	could	co-exist.	Under	this,	the	
IHR	was	hierarchically	superior	in	that	its	emphasis	on	preparedness	and	surveillance	
drove	 these	 relational	 interactions.	However,	 such	 hierarchy	was	 informal	 in	 that	 the	
norms	 from	 one	 regime	 –	 that	 of	 the	 WHO/IHR	 –	 were	 implemented	 through	 the	
receiving	regime	–	the	ICAO/Chicago	Convention.	 It	was,	 for	example,	 the	 ICAO	which	
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pushed	 for	 the	 development	 of	 CAPSCA	 to	 increase	 collaboration	 between	 various	
actors	concerned	with	the	overlap	of	public	health	and	aviation.118		
Finally,	while	 these	socio-legal	adaptations	were	 largely	 intended	to	adapt	 the	aircraft	
to	the	rationalities	of	global	health	security,119	the	arrangements	were	at	best	a	work	in	
progress	 with	 CAPSCA	 a	 long	 way	 off	 having	 all	 contracting	 States	 of	 the	 ICAO	 as	
members.120	However,	it	is	also	the	case	that	without	the	uneasy	alignment	of	extended	
networks,	 the	 generic	 plane	 might	 struggle	 to	 operate	 during	 an	 infectious	 disease	
outbreak.	Indeed,	as	Latour	remarked	on	the	extended	nature	of	networks,	‘Boeing	747s	
do	not	fly,	airlines	fly.’121	We	will	now	examine	the	impact	of	Ebola	on	these	socio-legal	
adaptations	to	understand	how	they	held	up	during	an	actual	outbreak.	
	
3.	EBOLA	SOCIO-LEGAL	ADAPTATION	
Following	the	declaration	of	 the	Ebola	outbreak	as	 a	PHEIC,	 the	WHO	advised	against	
general	travel	restrictions.	A	large	number	of	WHO	member	states	nevertheless	ignored	
this	 advice	 and	 instituted	 their	 own	 travel	 and	 trade	 measures.122	 These	 were	
accompanied	by	a	slew	of	cancellations	by	global	and	regional	airlines	such	as	Air	Côte	
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122	WHO,	‘Statement	of	the	3rd	Meeting	of	the	IHR	Emergency	Committee	on	the	2014	Ebola	Outbreak	in	
West	Africa’,	 (26	October	2014)	available	at	www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-
3rd-ihr-meeting/en/.		
d’Ivoire,	 Arik	 Air,	 Air	 France,	 British	 Airways,	 Emirates	 Airlines,	 and	 Kenya	 Airways,	
resulting	in	a	64%	decreased	in	scheduled	flights	to	the	Ebola	affected	countries.123	In	
response,	 the	WHO	 advised	 that	 ‘(f)light	 cancellations	 and	other	 travel	 restrictions	…	
[are]	 resulting	 in	detrimental	 economic	 consequences,	 and	hinder	 relief	 and	 response	
efforts	 risking	 further	 international	 spread.’124	 Air	 travel	 restrictions	 in	 particular	
‘impeded	 recruitment	 and	 return	 of	 international	 responders’125	 and	 could	 prompt	
‘uncontrolled	 migration;’	 the	 movement	 of	 people	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 global	
surveillance	framework.126		
Press	releases	issued	by	airline	carriers	revealed	the	flights	were	primarily	cancelled	for	
two	reasons;	pressure	from	unaffected	states	and,	secondly,	concern	for	passenger	and	
crew	 safety.	 According	 to	 British	 Airways	 ‘[t]he	 safety	 of	 our	 customers,	 crew	 and	
ground	 teams	 is	 always	 our	 top	 priority.’127	 While	 its	 decision	 to	 cancel	 flights	 was	
thought	 to	 be	 unilateral,128	 it	 was	 likely	 taken	 following	 indications	 from	 the	 UK’s	
Department	for	Transport	that	permission	to	fly	routes	connected	to	the	Ebola	outbreak	
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West	 Africa’,	 (21	 January	 2015)	 available	 at	
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128	 Stephen	 Phillips	MP	 (Sleaford	 and	 North	 Hykeham)	 (Con)	 (5	 November	 2014)	 Col	 940,	 Hansard;	
available	 at	 www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141105/debtext/141105-
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would	be	revoked.129	Air	France	received	directions	from	Paris	requesting	them	to	end	
their	 services	 to	 the	 countries	 affected	 by	 Ebola,	 and	 the	 airline's	 staff	 also	 signed	 a	
petition	 calling	on	 their	 employer	 to	avoid	Ebola-hit	 countries	 for	 their	own	safety.130	
Emirates	airline	cancelled	flights	stating	that	‘the	safety	of	our	passengers	and	crew	is	of	
the	highest	priority	and	will	not	be	compromised.’131		
Aircrew	clearly	played	a	key	role	in	highlighting	the	risk	of	inflight	transmission.	They	
saw	 existing	 standards;	 the	 socio-legal	 adaptations	 described	 above,	 as	 being	
insufficient	and	 lacking	in	detail.	The	US	Association	of	Flight	Attendants,	 for	 instance,	
lobbied	federal	aviation	authorities	to	adopt	a	more	defined	check-list	for	the	safety	of	
their	 members.132	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 were	 pushing	 for	 certainty.	 The	 proposed	
procedures	built	on	the	standards	developed	through	CAPSCA	and	added	extra-steps	for	
handling	 IHR	 reporting	 obligations,	 on-board	 containment	 of	 infected	 passenger,	 and	
additional	 safety	 precautions.	 Put	 plainly,	 in	 the	 search	 for	 clear	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	
deal	 with	 an	 infected	 passenger,	 flight	 attendants	 looked	 to	 the	 legal	 adaptations	 of	
CAPSCA.	 These	 were	 then	 developed	 to	 provide	 greater	 certainty	 for	 those	 at	 the	
frontline	of	infection.			
Would	 further	 socio-legal	 adaptation	 of	 the	 aircraft,	 manifesting	 as	 procedures	 or	
checklists,	 facilitate	 the	 resumption	 of	 flights?	A	 small	 number	 of	 airlines	maintained	
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their	operations	or	recommenced	flights	in	the	midst	of	the	outbreak	following	a	brief	
suspension.133	While	unaffected	states	were	clearly	averse	to	Ebola	spread	via	air	travel,	
these	airlines	built	on	standards	developed	through	CAPSCA.	An	EU	technical	inspection	
mission	 to	 Liberia,	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Guinea,	 for	 example,	 found	 that	 ‘a	 number	 of	
airlines	have	introduced	additional	temperature	checks	and	hand	out	forms	which	they	
process	 under	 their	 own	 responsibility.’134	 Belgian	 Airlines	 relocated	 their	 crew	 to	
overnight	 stays	 in	 jurisdictions	 without	 Ebola	 while	 thermoscanning	 equipment	 was	
used	to	monitor	any	passengers	showing	signs	of	illness	after	take-off.135	Clearly	Ebola	
triggered	 some	new	 ad	 hoc	 developments	 building	 on	 existing	 procedures	 developed	
via	CAPSCA	with	the	aim	of	resuming	or	maintain	flights.	
Further	energy	was	invested	at	the	international	level	in	persuading	private	operators	
to	 resume	 flying	 to	 the	 affected	 States.	 The	 ICAO	 approached	 individual	 airlines	 to	
establish	 the	 ‘conditions	necessary	 for	 the	 resumption	of	services.’136	The	 ICAO,	WHO	
and	the	IATA	also	indicated	to	states	that	‘revisions	to	the	WHO	document	on	travel	and	
transport’	would	be	considered.137	The	WHO	advised	States	 to	keep	working	 ‘with	the	
airlines	 to	 facilitate	 and	 harmonise	 communications	 and	 management	 regarding	
symptomatic	 passengers	 under	 the	 IHR	 (2005)	 mechanisms	 for	 contact	 tracing.’138	
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outbreak.aspx		
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Clearly	further	socio-legal	adaptation	of	aircraft	was	being	considered	with	the	goal	of	
resuming	 flights.	 This	 would	 once	 again	 rely	 on	 the	 technical	 work	 of	 regime	
interactions	bridging	the	ICAO	and	the	IHR.	
	
3.1	Ebola,	Regime	Interactions,	Legal	Technicalities,	and	the	Plane		
Following	the	Ebola	outbreak	being	declared	as	a	PHEIC,	the	WHO	issued	guidance	that	
airline	crew	should	‘be	appropriately	trained	and	medical	and	universal	precaution	kits	
for	managing	Ebola	cases	should	be	available	on	board.’139	Such	training	would	ensure	
the	 forms,	 kits	 and	 other	 artefacts	 of	 regime	 interaction	would	 be	 properly	 deployed	
and	 choreographed	 to	 maximise	 safety.	 Two	 months	 later,	 another	 new	 socio-legal	
adaptation	 appeared	 in	 response	 to	 Ebola.	 As	with	 other	 standards	 applicable	 to	 the	
plane’s	 interior,	 it	 was	 jointly	 developed	 through	 coordination	 linkages	 between	 the	
WHO,	 ICAO,	 IATA	 and	 the	Airports	 Council	 International	 (ACI).140	 The	 document	was	
labelled	as	the	‘Traveller	Public	Health	Declaration	Form.’141		
This	form	asked	travellers	to	self-report	any	symptoms	experienced	within	the	past	48	
hours,	or	Ebola	exposure	during	the	past	21	days.	This	information	would	be	passed	to	
authorities	 to	 target	 their	 screening	 efforts	 and	 augment	 their	 ability	 to	 trace	
passengers	should	an	infection	manifest	at	a	later	point.	It	could	co-function	alongside	
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141	 ‘Traveller	 Public	 Health	 Declaration’	 available	 at	
www.capsca.org/Documentation/Ebola/TravelerHealthDeclarationForm21Oct2014.pdf.	
the	IHR’s	less	specific	health	part	of	the	Aircraft	‘General	Declaration’142	which	was	to	be	
used	notify	destination	states	when	a	suspected	case	of	infection	manifested	in-flight.	
Where	adopted,	the	‘Traveller	Public	Health	Declaration	Form’	replicated	some	aspects,	
but	did	not	replace,	the	previously	discussed	Passenger	Locator	Card	Form	(PLF).	This	
new	document	requested	personal	details,	flight	and	seat	number	but,	in	contrast	to	the	
PLF,	 it	 operated	without	 the	 need	 for	 a	 suspected	 case	 of	 infection	 on	 board	 and	 the	
plane	 did	 not	 have	 to	 depart	 from	 a	 state	 affected	 by	 an	 outbreak.	 Now	 the	 mere	
existence	of	an	outbreak	and/or	the	declaration	of	a	PHEIC	would	be	sufficient	to	deploy	
the	 Traveller	 Public	 Health	 Declaration	 Form,	 	 even	 if	 the	 affected	 area	 was	 not	
connected	to	the	flight	path.	Lowering	the	threshold	for	gathering	passenger	data	meant	
that	 airlines	 could	 more	 readily	 respond	 to	 the	 risk	 transmission	 through	 air	 travel	
while	reassuring	destination	states	that	connecting	flights	would	not	constitute	a	gap	in	
surveillance.	
Guidance	accompanying	the	Traveller	Public	Health	Declaration	Form	recommended	it	
be	completed	and	 ‘reviewed	prior	 to	clearance	to	board’	or	before	passengers	 left	 the	
plane.	To	ensure	this	happened,	the	IATA	developed	a	‘script	to	be	read	by	cabin	crew	to	
passengers	prior	to	arrival;’143	
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Ladies	 and	 gentlemen,	 Actions	 have	 been	 put	 in	 place	 by	 public	 health	
authorities	 in	 response	 to	 the	 ongoing	 outbreak	 of	 Ebola	 (...)	 Public	 health	
authorities	 require	 that	 all	 travellers	 (sic)	 complete	 a	 health	 declaration	 form	
before	arrival	…	Every	traveler	(sic)	must	complete	a	form.	(…)	This	is	required	
as	a	precautionary	measure	even	if	you	are	feeling	well.	
	
Together	 this	 form	 and	 script	 illustrate	 the	 deepening	 enrolment	 of	 private	 sector	
airlines	into	the	IHR	surveillance	network.	It	also	represents	a	move	towards	securing	
complete	public	health	data	from	all	passengers,	a	development	which	triggered	alarm	
bells	with	airline	companies.	During	the	Ebola	outbreak,	calls	for	greater	data	sharing	to	
facilitate	the	effective	tracing	of	passengers	included	the	proposed	automated	sharing	of	
passenger	data.	At	the	height	of	the	outbreak	US	Customs	and	Border	Protection	shared	
21	 Passenger	 Name	 Records	 (PNR)	 with	 the	 US	 Centre	 for	 Disease	 Control	 (CDC)144	
while	 the	 UK,	 ‘also	 demanded	 the	 information	 from	 a	 handful	 of	 airlines	 to	 identify	
people	travelling	 from	areas	hit	by	Ebola	[so	as	 to]	 target	 them	for	screening.’145	PNR	
data	is	information	provided	by	passengers	and	automatically	collected	by	air	carriers	
during	 reservation	 and	 check-in	 procedures.	 It	 includes	 information,	 such	 as	 travel	
dates,	travel	itinerary,	ticket	information,	and	contact	details.146		
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The	airline	 industry	was	 implacably	against	 the	burden	of	PNR	data	 sharing	with	 the	
IATA	advising	that,	 ‘States	should	be	discouraged	from	implementing	disproportionate	
and	 unworkable	 new	 passenger	 data	 requirements’.147	 The	 IATA	 presented	 the	
proposed	measure	as	a	 travel	restriction	with	the	potential	 for	producing	undesirable	
outcomes	for	surveillance	and	public	health,	
(A)s	 States	 start	 indicating	 their	 intent	 to	 control	 passenger	 movements	 via	
provision	of	PNR,	those	seeking	to	flee	Ebola	affected	States	will	actively	evolve	
their	strategies.	They	will	start	booking	separate	tickets	(i.e.	Western	Africa	to	a	
European	 transfer	 hub	 and	 then	 a	 separate	 reservation	 from	 that	 EU	 hub	
onward).	In	those	cases	–	the	PNR	will	not	show	the	true	origin	and	the	carrier	
boarding	 the	 person	 at	 the	 EU	 hub	 will	 have	 no	 access	 to	 up-line	 data.	 We	
therefore	 believe	 that	 such	 passenger	 data	 requirements	 are	 invariably	
disproportionate	to	the	potential	benefits	they	could	derive.148		
Companies	with	passenger	data	processed	 in	 the	EU,	 it	was	 claimed,	would	be	 legally	
prohibited	from	providing	PNR	data	to	third	countries	without	a	specific	data	protection	
agreement	 in	place.149	Moreover,	data	transfer	would	typically	be	restricted	to	a	case-
by-case	 basis.150	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 Traveller	 Public	 Health	 Declaration	 Form	 can	 be	
understood	as	a	substitute	for	PNR	data	sharing,	a	confessional	space	for	the	passenger	
to	provide	all	of	the	data	needed	for	effective	contact	tracing.151	It	could	capture	data	on	
journeys	 with	 multiple	 flights	 and	 not	 just	 those	 coming	 directly	 from	 countries	
enduring	an	outbreak	by	asking	passengers	to,	
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List	 all	 countries	where	 you	 have	 been	 in	 the	 past	 21	 days	 (including	 airports	
and	port	transits	and	where	you	live).	List	the	most	recent	country	first	(where	
you	boarded).	If	you	need	more	space	use	the	back	of	the	page.	
It	 could	also	 speak	 to	 the	 concerns	of	 those	 countries	pushing	 for	 flight	 cancellations,	
entry	 screening	 or	 additional	 PNR	 sharing	 by	 capturing	 relevant	 information	without	
the	 burden	 of	 managing	 the	 transnational	 sharing	 of	 passenger	 data.	 Furthermore,	
unlike	 PNR	 data,152	 this	 form	 was	 better	 adapted	 to	 capturing	 passengers	 changing	
seats	mid-flight,	thereby	assisting	better	contract	tracing	and	surveillance.		
The	Traveller	 Public	Health	Declaration	 Form	 is	 an	 example	 of	 socio-legal	 adaptation	
prompted	by	the	Ebola	outbreak.	 It	emerged	from	the	relational	space	of	CAPSCA	and	
embodied	the	bridging	work	between	the	norms	and	actors	of	two	legal	regimes.	Their	
reconciliation	 involved	 socio-legal	 adaptions	 explicitly	 directed	 at	 improving	 safety	
(Chicago	Convention)	but	also	deepening	surveillance	measures	(IHR).	The	practice	of	
regime	 interaction	also	reveals	 the	role	played	by	private	air	carriers	as	 transnational	
implementers	 of	 public	 health	 and	 aviation	 norms	 as	 well	 as	 their	 progressive	
incorporation	into	global	surveillance	networks.	
3.2	Summations		
The	complex	arrangements	discussed	above	required	an	uneasy	alliance	between	many	
different	actors	working	 through	 the	multilateral	 space	of	CAPSCA.	As	a	 collaborative	
arrangement,	 CAPSCA	 came	 into	 existence	 as	 a	 response	 to	 legal	 diversity	 and	
specialisation.	 All	 actors	 engaged	 in	 this	 space	 were	 united	 through	 problem-driven	
governance	toward	the	shared	goal	of	the	mobility	of	the	aircraft	during	an	outbreak	of	
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infectious	 disease.	 While	 rooted	 in	 compromise,	 this	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 norms,	
rationalities	or	obligations	of	 the	 IHR,	 the	Chicago	Convention,	 and	 the	private	 sector	
regimes	would	automatically	co-function.	Even	with	the	changes	articulated	above,	not	
all	private	sector	operators	recommenced	flights.	In	other	words,	while	efforts	such	as	
the	 Traveller	 Public	 Health	 Declaration	 Form	 were	 representative	 of	 attempts	 to	
facilitate	 regime	 interoperation,	 there	 was	 contingency	 to	 such	 efforts.	 Nevertheless,	
they	 provide	 a	 snapshot	 of	 the	 use	 of	 legal	 tools	 and	 artefacts	 to	 facilitate	 regime	
interaction;	a	cumulative	process	with	its	origins	in	the	SARS	outbreak.		
	
4.	TRANSLATIONS	
Infectious	disease	can	be	a	fearsome	teacher	and	the	events	of	SARS	brought	attention	
to	 how	 globalised	 travel	 can	 hasten	 the	 spread	 of	 disease	 internationally.	 It	 also	
highlighted	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 regime	 ‘gap’	 as	 the	 regimes	of	 global	 public	 health	 and	
aviation	provided	 insufficient	guidance	on	how	 the	generic	 infected	passenger	 should	
be	governed.	Efforts	after	SARS	to	close	that	gap	are	still	ongoing	and	the	2014	Ebola	
outbreak	in	West	Africa	provided	a	further	punctuation	point	to	these	processes.		
The	existence	of	a	gap	between	the	Chicago	Convention	and	the	IHR	was	not	an	instance	
of	conflict	within	international	law.	At	the	doctrinal	level,	there	are	rules	of	the	conflict	
of	 laws	 aimed	 at	 minimising	 or	 avoiding	 intra-systemic	 conflicts	 between	 different	
international	 treaties	 using	 rules	 to	 assert	 jurisdictional	 hierarchy,	 e.g.	 lex	 specialis.	
These	would	 not,	 however,	 have	 addressed	 the	 regime	 overlap	 at	 play	when	 dealing	
with	 infectious	 disease	 spread	 via	 air	 travel.	 What	 was	 required	 instead	 was	 a	
synergistic	 and	 coherent	 response	 aimed	 at	 addressing	 a	 common	 concern;	 that	 of	
ensuring	the	mobility	of	the	airplane	during	an	infectious	disease	outbreak.		
The	 fragmentation	 of	 international	 law	 leads	 to	 questions	 of	 how	 different	 regimes	
avoid	 and	 resolve	 conflict	 as	well	 as	 how	 they	 interact	 to	 address	 issues	 of	 common	
concern.	 Scholarship	 on	 relational	 interactions	 has	 acknowledged	 that	 particular	
regimes	can	‘exercise	concurrent	authority	over	actions	or	events’	and	hence,	are	often	
focused	 on	 ‘the	 articulation	 of	 new	 international	 norms	 to	 prospectively	 govern	
behaviour	within	a	particular	area	of	international	relations.’153	Here,	quite	clearly,	we	
are	 dealing	 with	 a	 similar	 concern;	 two	 regimes	 with	 concurrent	 authority	 over	 a	
particular	 issue.	What	our	study	revealed	was	the	 importance	of	legal	 technicalities	 in	
this	process.		
This	 technical	work,	designed	 to	 facilitate	 regime	 interoperation,	provided	scaffolding	
for	regime	bridging	work	at	particular	legal	scales.	Ebola,	for	instance,	was	classified	as	
being	of	‘international	concern’,	resulting	in	the	IHR	and	Chicago	interacting	to	provide	
detailed	 standards	 for	 this	 international	 scale.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Ebola	 can	 be	
interpreted	through	a	more	 local	 legal	scale,	such	as	 the	health	and	safety	concern	 for	
particular	 airline	 crew	or	 public	 health	 risk	 at	 the	 national	 level	 in	 unaffected	 states.	
Rather	than	 looking	 into	how	these	 local,	national	and	 international	scales	are	sorted,	
flight	 cancellations	 exposed	 the	 struggle	 of	 the	 international	 legal	 regime	 to	 even	
feature	in	this	aspect	of	the	governance	of	communicable	disease	outbreaks.		
Technical	 bridging	work,	 including	 socio-legal	 adaptation	 of	 the	 aircraft,	was	 hence	 a	
process	of	 articulation	 for	 the	 international	 scale.	How	should	 two	 international	 legal	
regimes	fit	together	to	speak	coherently	and	enable	the	speaking	of	international	law,	or	
international	juris-diction?	As	a	result,	regime	interactions	focused	on	bringing	the	IHR	
and	the	Chicago	Convention	together	but	their	integration	would	also	need	worked	out	
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in	 the	 concrete	 situation	 of	 the	 flight.	 Eventually,	 increasingly	 clear	 international	
guidance	for	‘international	air	transport’	would	emerge	from	the	shadow	of	Ebola.	Take	
for	instance	this	interim	guidance	from	the	WHO	stating	that;	
National	 public	 health	 authorities	 should	 coordinate	 with	 aircraft	 and	 airport	
operators	and	ensure	that	Passenger	Locator	Forms	are	available	in	flight	and/or	
at	 destination	 airports.	 Airport	 personnel	 and	 cabin	 crew	 should	 be	
appropriately	 trained	 for	 managing	 EVD	 cases/contacts,	 and	 medical	 and	
universal	 precaution	 kits	 should	 be	 available	 on	 board,	 in	 accordance	 with	
International	Civil	Aviation	Organization	(ICAO)	guidelines.154	
Essentially,	we	see	the	two	regimes	interoperating	through	a	choreography	managed	by	
air	crew.	Training	and	guidance	indicated	when	to	use	safety	kits	(Chicago	Convention)	
and	when	to	deploy	surveillance	tools	(IHR).	We	saw	with	Ebola	that	further	technical	
work	was	 required,	 resulting	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 additional	 legal	 artefacts	 such	 as	 the	
Traveller	 Public	 Health	 Declaration	 Form.	 Our	 study	 suggests	 that	 these	 adaptations	
played	a	significant	role	in	translating	rationalities	of	international	law	into	the	‘lower	
level’	legal	scale	and	procedures	of	managing	airline	travel	and	passengers.	With	a	more	
coherent	 framework,	 these	 quasi-legal	 objects	 and	 procedures	 could	 facilitate	
international	law	gaining	more	 ‘bite’	 in	decision-making	around	flight	cancellations	by	
national	and	private-sector	actors.		
Promoting	 international	 law	 in	 the	 response	 to	 Ebola	 is	 what	 Valverde	 would	 call	
jurisdiction;	an	intervention	in	the	sorting	process	determining	which	legal	scale	applies	
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when	 (and	 how).155	 Technical	work	 to	 adapt,	 modify	 and	 translate	 international	 law	
into	a	suite	of	procedures,	forms	and	kits	aimed	to	encourage	flights	to	continue	during	
the	 Ebola	 outbreak.	 Understanding	 regime	 interactions	 in	 this	 way	 helps	 us	 to	
appreciate	 the	 hidden	 technical	 legal	work	 that	 forms	 part	 of	 a	 complex	 response	 of	
global	health	security.		
Accordingly,	 while	 legal	 technicalities	 can	 be	 written	 off	 as	 neutral	 and	 unworthy	 of	
further	 attention,	 they	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 defining	 international	 law’s	
jurisdiction	and	in	facilitating	the	ongoing	interaction	between	the	applicable	regimes.	
The	 resultant	 regime	 interactions	 did	 not	of	 course	 produce	 full	 compliance	with	 the	
WHO’s	recommendations;	not	all	 flights	recommenced	and,	as	we	saw,	 there	was	also	
pushback	by	the	private	sector.	However,	 it	 is	also	clear	 that	 the	ongoing	 interactions	
between	 the	 applicable	 regimes	 helped	 facilitate	 an	 increasingly	 coherent	 set	 of	
standards	for	supporting	the	goals	of	global	health	security.		
		
5.	CONCLUSIONS		
Much	 has	 been	written	 on	 the	 international	 response	 to	 the	 Ebola	 outbreak	 in	West	
Africa	with	a	particular	focus		on	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	WHO	response.156	We	have	
not	 wished	 to	 supplement	 this	 already	 comprehensive	 literature.	 Our	 study	 was	
prompted	by	an	 interest	 in	 the	cancellation	of	flights	 to	the	affected	region	despite	an	
authoritative	 consensus	 to	 the	 contrary.	While	 there	 has	 been	 some	work	 looking	 at	
how	 best	 to	 hold	 to	 account	 states	 which	 enact	 disproportionate	 trade	 and	 travel	
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restrictions	 during	 PHEIC,157	 there	 has	 been	 scant	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 processes	 that	
operated	 to	 facilitate	 compliance	 and,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 resumption	 of	 flights.	 The	
interactions	 between	 public	 health	 and	 aviation	 regimes	 have	 also	 attracted	 little	
attention.	Despite	a	growing	socio-legal	scholarship	on	the	role	of	legal	technicalities	in	
public	health,	no	 comprehensive	 study	has	yet	been	undertaken	on	 the	 importance	of	
legal	technicalities	in	securing	regime	interoperation	in	this	domain.		
Our	study	attempts	to	address	the	above	gaps	in	the	literature.	We	demonstrated	how	
legal	technicalities,	while	often	written	off	as	mundane	and	unworthy	of	attention,	were	
deployed	to	harmonize	the	norms,	actors	and	processes	of	each	regime	in	responding	to	
the	 international	 spread	 of	 disease	 via	 air	 travel.	 This	work	 therefore	 builds	upon	 an	
emerging	scholarship	inspired	by	the	work	of	Annelise	Riles158	and	Mariana	Valverde159	
which	 has	 shown	 how	mundane	 legal	 tools	 exert	 their	 own	 agency,	 thereby	 making	
them	worthy	of	greater	attention.160	Far	from	inert,	they	ought	to	be	factored	in	when	
considering	the	international	response	to	an	outbreak	or	other	complex	multi-sectoral	
concerns.	Our	exposition	of	 the	 technical	 in	 securing	 coherent	and	synergistic	 regime	
interactions	 further	 contributes	 to	 the	 growing	 literature	 on	 relational	 regime	
interactions.			
From	 the	 foregoing	analysis,	we	wish	 to	draw	 five	 significant	 conclusions.	The	 first	 is	
the	idea	that	efforts	to	respond	to	Ebola	and,	indeed	infectious	disease	more	generally,	
by	necessity	 implicate	 ‘the	 legal.’	 It	 is	present	 in	how	disease	 is	measured,	monitored	
and	addressed.	 In	 the	 context	of	our	study,	such	 legal	work	 included	 the	operation	of	
legal	technicalities	and	deployment	of	objects	to	facilitate	the	inter-operation	of	the	IHR	
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(2005)	 and	 the	 Chicago	 Convention.	 	 While	 the	 two	 regimes	 contained	 different	
rationalities,	 the	 creation	 of	 coordination	 linkages	 helped	 to	 resolve	 their	 functional	
overlap	 as	 well	 as	 mediating	 the	 participation	 of	 the	 private	 sector.	 Through	 this	
arrangement,	 the	ensuing	production	of	 legal	practices	and	objects	 contributed	to	 the	
adaption	of	the	aircraft	to	outbreaks.		
Second,	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 aircraft	 to	 address	 the	 threat	 posed	 by	 communicable	
diseases	 is	 part	 of	 an	 on-going,	 complex	 modification	 of	 sanitary	 frontiers.	 We	
demonstrated	how	the	production	of	the	Traveller	Public	Health	Declaration	Form	and	
specialised	 kits	 brought	 the	 private	 sector	 more	 firmly	 into	 the	 fold	 of	 bordering	
processes	and	the	surveillance	regime	underpinning	global	health	security.	They	were	
now	 engaged	 directly	 in	 the	 separation	 and	 ‘social	 sorting’161	 of	 the	 sick	 from	 the	
healthy	 between	 national	 frontiers.	 This	 assimilation	 also	 has	 the	 effect	 of	
instrumentalising	aircrew	and	the	aircraft	as	tools	of	disease	surveillance.		
Third,	the	adaptations	that	occurred	post-SARS	did	not	flow	from	a	single	international	
legal	 regime	 or	 from	 a	 plurality	 of	 legal	 regimes	 with	 a	 clear	 hierarchy.	 Rather,	
hierarchy	was	emergent;	a	function,	among	other	things,	of	the	hybrid	space	of	CAPSCA	
which	worked	to	bridge	two	specialised	regimes	of	law.	Our	article	fits	within	the	wider	
international	 law	 literature	 on	 relational	 regime	 interactions	 and	 demonstrates	 how	
such	interactions	may	not	flow	from	a	normative	or	singular	hierarchical	source.	Rather,	
they	may	encompass	a	range	of	actors	and	norms	within	a	highly	plural	 legal	space;	a	
decentralized	operative	legality.162		
                                                             
161	Barker,	supra	note	40,	at	358.	
162	 In	 this	 vein,	 see	 M.	 A.	 Young,	 ‘Fragmentation	 or	 interaction:	 the	 WTO,	 fisheries	 subsidies,	 and	
international	law’,	(2009)	8	(4)	World	Trade	Review	477;	A.	Fischer-Lescano	and	G.	Teubner,	supra	note	
This	process	ultimately	came	to	be	driven	principally	by	the	IHR.	It	was	ordered	by	the	
norm	 of	 global	 health	 security	 with	 its	 attendant	 focus	 on	 surveillance	 and	
preparedness.	In	this	context	jurisdiction,	that	is,	the	question	of	which	regime	operates	
where	 and	 when,	 is	 compostable,	 contingent	 and	 not	 dependent	 on	 doctrinal	 legal	
hierarchy.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Ebola,	 when	 the	 private	 sector	 expressed	
reluctance	to	take	on	duties	traditionally	borne	by	departure	and	arrival	states,	we	saw	
how	the	assemblage	giving	rise	to	jurisdiction	could	unravel.		
Fourth,	in	our	focus	on	legal	technicalities,	we	found	that	tools	really	do	matter163	when	
it	comes	to	regime	interactions.	Legal	technicalities	and	artefacts	were	at	the	forefront	
of	public	health	efforts	at	ensuring	the	mobility	of	international	flights.	The	inclusion	of	
additional	public	health	procedures	and	forms	as	well	as	the	Universal	Precaution	Kit	-	a	
box	 the	 size	 of	 a	 suitcase	 –	 were	 legally	 charged	 artefacts	 aimed	 at	 the	 lifting	 of	
restrictions	on	 flights	during	the	height	of	an	outbreak.	Thus,	regime	 interactions	and	
the	 legal	 technicalities	 they	 implicate	are	an	overlooked	but	 integral	 feature	of	 global	
health	governance.	Our	findings	may	have	value	for	other	areas	of	international	law	and	
help	to	revise	theoretical	accounts	of	how	international	legal	regimes	interface.164		
Fifth,	we	found	that	 the	aircraft	 is	a	site	of	 legal	contestation.	Tensions	were	revealed	
between	 the	 intersections	of	 legal	systems.	These	were	particularly	prevalent	when	 it	
came	to	the	collection	and	handling	of	passenger	data	and	were	only	partly	resolved	by	
the	bridging	work	performed	between	the	regimes.	This	reveals	a	legal	plurality	within	
the	 constitutive	 assemblage	 of	 global	 health	 security;	 a	 finding	which	 has	 significant	
implications	for	the	development	of	international	responses	to	infectious	disease.		
                                                                                                                                                                                             
62;	 L.	 Viellechner,	 ‘Responsive	 legal	 pluralism:	 The	 emergence	 of	 transnational	 conflicts	 law’,	 6	 (2)	
Transnational	Legal	Theory	312.		
163	In	this	vein,	see	Riles,	supra	note	16,	at	986.	
164	In	this	vein,	see	Burchardt,	supra	note	65	and	Dunoff,	supra	note	16.	
While	we	have	been	able	to	draw	a	number	of	original	and	significant	conclusions	from	
our	analysis,	there	are	numerous	areas	ripe	for	further	research.	In	particular,	it	is	clear	
that	more	attention	ought	to	be	played	to	the	legal	techniques	of	regime	interactions	in	
response	to	complex	multi-sectoral	challenges.			
		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
